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Brand as
Information Intermediary
Kishanthi Parella†
This essay examines how brand names facilitate exchanges
that would not otherwise occur in the global marketplace because
of asymmetries of information between buyers and sellers. A
transnational corporation facilitates exchanges by providing
information through its brand that persuades Group A (buyers)
to exchange with Group B (third party suppliers). Recognizing
the information functions leads to two important implications.
First, brand corporations may need to disclose their
intermediary role to consumers in order to reduce risks to
consumers, workers, and other actors in the supply chain.
Second, the type of disclosure matters. While different
disclosure strategies may prove similarly effective at shining a
light on conditions in supply chains, some disclosure strategies
involve greater brand damage and are therefore more likely to
incentivize brand corporations to do something about conditions
in their supply chains. Therefore, viewing corporations as
information intermediaries provides us with a useful lens to
evaluate competing strategies for information regulation
concerning the supply chain.

Introduction
An information intermediary is a party who informs one group of
actors (Group A) of the characteristics, capacities, and other relevant
information of another group of actors (Group B). Information
intermediaries matter because in a market
characterized by
asymmetries of information, Group A may not exchange with Group
B but for the information that intermediaries supply.
In this essay, I suggest that in many global supply chains the
function of a transnational corporation is best conceived of as an
information intermediary. Many corporations have outsourced several
functions to one or more third party suppliers: manufacturing,
†
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Phil. in International Relations, University of Cambridge; B.A.,
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research and development, marketing, sales, and customer support.1
We may not purchase the products from a third-party supplier
because we are unfamiliar with it and cannot verify the quality of the
product before purchase; these suppliers do not have a brand that we
trust. Therefore, we rely on the information conveyed by the
transnational corporation through its brand when we make our
purchasing decisions. The transnational corporation acts as an
intermediary that facilitates market exchanges by providing
information through its brand that persuades Group A (buyers) to
exchange with Group B (third party suppliers).2
Recognizing the information intermediary role of corporations has
at least two important implications. First, brand corporations may
need to disclose their intermediary role to consumers in order to
prevent these consumers from suffering “identity harms” that result
from risks in the supply chain.3 Second, the intermediary role played
by brand corporations can potentially hurt more than just consumers.
Practices that persist in supply chains also harm workers in overseas
sites.4 The way corporations disclose information can incentivize them
to deter wrongdoing in the supply chain.5 Their willingness to do so
depends on the incentives created in the regulations that apply to
them. While different disclosure strategies may prove effective at
shining a light on conditions in supply chains, some strategies might
prove better at incentivizing intermediary cooperation than others.
Therefore, viewing corporations as information intermediaries provides
us with a useful lens to evaluate competing strategies for information
regulation concerning the supply chain.

I. Understanding the Information Role of
Transnational Brand Corporations: The Maghribi
Traders Re-Visited
Many American household names do not make the goods we
associate with them. Instead, they outsource a variety of traditional
1.

See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH.
L. REV.

747, 749 (2014) (listing functions outsourced by international businesses).
2.

See Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic
Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (2002).

3.

See Sarah Dadush, Identity Harms, 89 COLO. L. REV. ___(forthcoming
2018) (defining and discussing “identity harms”), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990526.

4.

See Parella, supra note 1, at 801 (brief discussion of intermediary
reporting affecting workers’ rights).

5.

See Parella, supra note 1, at 807 (brief discussion of intermediary
reporting on supply chain).
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business functions to third-party suppliers, including manufacturing,
customer service, marketing, sales, design, and research and
development.6 The corporation may outsource these functions to one
or, more likely, several actors both here in the United States and
abroad.7
For example, while Nike sells tens of millions of athletic shoes in
the United States every year, “all of the firm’s manufacturing
operations are conducted overseas.”8Additionally, Nike “never
relocated domestic production abroad, . . . because the firm actually
originated by importing shoes from Japan. It has subcontracted nearly
all of its production’ overseas ever since.”9 The result is that “[i]n the
United States, Nike has developed essentially as a design, distribution,
and marketing enterprise.”10 As one of Nike’s vice-presidents aptly
stated, “‘We are marketers and designers’” - “‘[w]e don’t know the
first thing about manufacturing.’”11
For these reasons, we usually think about the functions overseas
suppliers provide to transnational corporations as opposed to
exploring the functions that transnational corporations provide to
overseas suppliers. It is also important, however, to understand the
benefits that flow from the brand corporation to the overseas supplier
(besides payment).
Consider a hypothetical involving Acme, a US-based corporation,
that outsources all of the functions necessary to support its primary
product, Widget, to a third party, Overseas Supplier. In an extreme
example of outsourcing, assume that the latter organization designs
Widget (including improvements), invests in R&D concerning
Widget’s technology, manufactures, markets, and sells Widget in the
United States.

6.

Parella, supra note 1, at 749.

7.

See Samuel Palmisano, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, 85 FOREIGN
AFF. 127, 131 (2006) (“Now the spread of outsourcing is encouraging
companies to view themselves as an array of specialized components:
procurement, manufacturing, research, sales, distribution, and so on. . . .
The corporation, then, is emerging as a combination of various functions
and skills-some tightly bound and some loosely coupled-and it integrates
these components of business activity and production on a global basis
to produce goods and services for its customers.”).

8.

Miguel Korzeniewicz, Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike
and the Global Athletic Footwear Industry, in COMMODITY CHAINS &
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 247, 252 (Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz eds.,
1994).

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.
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Overseas Supplier may not be able to sell in the US market
without Acme due to information asymmetries or “the lemons
problem.” George Akerlof explained that information asymmetries
often characterize market exchanges because a potential buyer knows
less about the product than the product’s seller.12 These asymmetries
increase the risk that the seller may exploit the buyer by selling him a
product he would not want if he had known the truth before the
sale.13 These asymmetries also occur in the sale of goods in the global
marketplace: A buyer in one country may refuse to purchase a good
from a seller in another country because the former cannot evaluate
the quality of the good prior to sale.14 In these situations,
transnational corporations serve as critical information intermediaries
by addressing information asymmetry problems in cross-border sales –
information problems that would prevent sales in the absence of the
information intermediary functions performed by transnational
corporations.
In order to appreciate the significance, consider how information
asymmetries determine the likelihood of sales in two hypotheticals. In
Hypothetical 1, a transnational corporation based in the United
States, Acme, sells Widget. Buyer is excited to purchase this new
product, but wary because he cannot verify its properties prior to sale
(even a cursory examination at a store will not reveal all potential
hidden defects). Buyer runs the risk that Acme may sell him an
inferior product; however, Buyer has access to other resources that
give him greater confidence in the transaction because he (a)
purchased from Acme previously (prior dealings), (b) trusts Acme
based on available information (reputation), or (c) feels confident in
post-sale assurances that reduce the risk of opportunism, such as
return policies, warranties, and dispute resolution procedures. For
these reasons, he decides to go ahead with the purchase of Widget
from Acme.
Now consider how the information problem grows if Buyer does
not purchase a Widget from Acme, but instead purchases it directly
from Overseas Supplier. In Hypothetical 2, Buyer is not familiar with
Overseas Supplier, having never purchased from it. Buyer can find
very little information about Overseas Supplier online and there are
very few customer reviews of Widget. Overseas Supplier sells directly
from another country and its website states that any disputes arising
from product sales will be arbitrated in that country as the exclusive
12.

George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 489 (1970).

13.

See Akerlof supra note 12, at 489-490 (illustration of effects of
asymmetry of information between buyer and seller).

14.

See Gillette, supra note 2, at 1169-70 (discussion of information
asymmetry in global context).
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forum. Unsurprisingly, Buyer feels less willing to enter into an
exchange with Overseas Supplier because he lacks the information
that an exchange with Acme would make available.15 He does not
have any previous dealings with Overseas Supplier and is unaware of
its reputation. Additionally, Overseas Supplier’s return policy requires
returns to its overseas location and disputes are subject to mandatory
arbitration before a foreign tribunal. He therefore foregoes the
exchange (despite how badly he wants a Widget!!).
This illustrates the challenge information asymmetries in crossborder sales presents. A buyer in one country knows very little about
the goods offered for sale in another or about the merchants offering
it. The enforcement sanctions for opportunism are also weak or
insufficient to assuage the buyer, who may need to incur high costs to
verify product quality or protect his interests after the parties
complete the sale.
These problems are not new. Avner Greif famously studied
information problems encountered by Maghribi traders in longdistance trade in the 11th century.16 These traders sold their goods
across long distances through agents.17 This presented an information
problem because these agents operated distantly and beyond the
direct supervision of the merchants; therefore, the latter undertook
the risk that the former may take advantage of them.18 To address
this risk, the traders established coalitions that served as information
intermediaries regarding the behavior of agents: the coalition had the
capability to disseminate information regarding agent conduct rapidly
throughout the coalition, thereby putting agents on notice that news
of any opportunistic behavior would reach the relevant merchant.19 As
an information intermediary, the coalition helped to correct
information asymmetries between agent and trader across greater
distances and gave the latter greater confidence in his transactions
with agents.20
15.

See Gillette, supra note 2, at 1166-67 (“[T]he need for buyers and sellers
to trust each other where compliance with contractual terms cannot
readily be verified ex ante or enforced ex post diminishes the likelihood
of trade. Thus, even while electronic commerce reduces search costs and
transaction costs of putting together willing buyers and sellers, its full
potential cannot be realized if parties fear that trading partners will
perform opportunistically because remedies for breach or chiseling are
unavailable.”).

16.

Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on
the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989).

17.

Id. at 864-65.

18.

Id. at 865.

19.

Id. at 867-69; Gillette, supra note 2 at 1177.

20.

Greif, supra note 16 at 879-80.
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This example illustrates how information intermediaries play vital
roles in facilitating exchanges across great distances. The information
asymmetry between a Maghribi merchant and his agent is similar to
the information asymmetry between Overseas Supplier and Buyer
because the latter fears opportunistic behavior by the former,
operating at great distance from himself. Buyer is reluctant to
transact with Overseas Supplier without some type of information
intermediary to supply relevant information, especially concerning the
risk of opportunism. With the Maghribi merchant, the coalition
transmitted information regarding agent behavior.21 With the Buyer,
brand serves as the information intermediary.
Consider Hypothetical 3, where Overseas Supplier and Acme work
together. Overseas Supplier undertakes all production functions for
Widget. However, Acme stamps its name to every Widget that
Overseas Supplier makes and sells. This stamp is key. It assuages
Buyer’s concern and he is willing to buy a Widget now even though
he refused to do so in Hypothetical 2. These two hypotheticals are
almost identical except for one difference: the Acme stamp.
In order to understand the function of the Acme stamp, we need
to change our perspective on who we exchange with when we
purchase goods made in overseas supply chains. In Hypothetical 3,
Buyer may believe that his primary exchange partner is Acme (and
he may be oblivious to Overseas Supplier). However, in reality, his
exchange partner is Overseas Supplier.
So, if Buyer primarily exchanges with Overseas Supplier, what
role does Acme have? Acme is in the business of selling informational
products. Here, information products do not refer to information
technology or related products and services. Instead, information
products refers to the provision of information concerning a product
or service and the associated merchant or service provider. Brand is
an information product because it tells us certain things about
Widget, for example: reliability, desirability, popularity, affordability,
etc. This informational product helps to address the information
asymmetry between a US buyer and an overseas merchant, thereby
facilitating the exchange between the two. By branding the product
made overseas with an Apple logo or a Nike swoosh, the corporations
“rent” their reputation to Overseas Supplier in order to facilitate
exchange between it and a domestic buyer.22 Without that
21.

Greif, supra note 16, at 867-68.

22.

See Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LAW J. 239, 289-90 (1984) Yuri Mishina,
Emily S. Block, and Michael J. Mannor, The Path Dependence of
Organizational
Reputation:
How
Social
Judgment
Influences
Assessments of Capability & Character, 33 STRAT. MGMT. J. 459, 459460 (2012); Ronald Sims, Toward a Better Understanding of
Organizational Efforts to Rebuild Reputation following an Ethical
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intermediary role, Buyer may be unwilling to exchange with Overseas
Supplier.

II. Implications For Information Regulation

What significance does recognizing the information intermediary
role of corporations in modern exchanges have? The remainder of this
essay explores two questions: (a) what is the nature of brand
responsibility in those exchanges when the primary role of the
corporation is to bring buyers and suppliers together, and (b) can we
borrow lessons from the regulation of information intermediaries in
other exchange contexts in order to regulate transnational supply
chains more effectively?
A.

The Responsibility of a Name

When we shop, we often make decisions based on brand names
that signify certain attributes to us: quality, sustainability,
desirability, affordability, and even community. Brand can serve as a
beacon, attracting us to certain products over others. As discussed
above, in some contexts, the primary function of a brand is
information intermediary by bringing together sellers and buyers who
may not otherwise exchange. In these circumstances, do brand
companies need to disclose their intermediary role and, if so, why?
Consider a hypothetical where Buyer purchases a Widget from
Acme because Acme has an established reputation for product quality
and affordability. Buyer later learns that Acme had outsourced its
manufacturing tasks for Widget to a variety of third-party suppliers,
but Widget continues to perform exactly as Buyer expected and
provides the best deal around. Is Buyer entitled to know the true
identity of her exchange partners and the nature of the exchange?
There are two reasons why Buyer is entitled to this information
disclosure: consent and risks. First, Buyer did not consent to the
exchange that occurred. She received the good that she contracted for
but not under the conditions she imagined. This more complex
Scandal, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 453, 455 (2009)(“[T]he value of a good
reputation continues to grow largely because of the competitive
advantage and market differentiation it delivers - higher sales generated
by satisfied customers and their referrals; relationships with the right
strategic and business partners; ability to attract develop and retain the
best talent; benefit of the doubt by stakeholders if crisis strikes; spread
of positive word of mouth; potential to raise capital and share price; and
in some cases, the option to charge premium prices. Also, in an age of
regulatory watchdogs, a positive reputation can improve relationships
with government officials and regulators.”); Charles Fombrun, The
Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE REPUTATION 104-107 (Barnett & Pollock eds., 2012).
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transaction involves more actors, many of whom are not subject to
the direct control of Acme. Her assumptions of Acme’s brand – the
information upon which she made the decision to purchase – may not
extend to all those actors. Buyer did not consent to an exchange with
third party suppliers; she consented to an exchange with Acme. It’s
not that Buyer would not have consented to exchanging with third
party suppliers; the issue is that she, in fact, did not.
Buyer entered into the exchange for Widget based on threshold
information that Acme supplied to Buyer based on its brand. The
brand provided Buyer the information she needed in order to go
ahead with the exchange. However, if Buyer had known that her
exchange involved a variety of third-party suppliers who were her
exchange partners, and not Acme, Buyer remains in an information
deficit.
She lacks information regarding characteristics of the
exchange and she may not have consented to it without first
obtaining that additional information. But Buyer does not know
what she does not know because the brand masks the information
problem. It is not the identity of the counterparty that determines
whether Buyer would go ahead with the exchange but the extent of
the information that Buyer has before she consents to the exchange.
The second reason it matters to Buyer that she knows the
intermediary role played by Acme is that the actual exchange exposed
her to unique risks of which she had no awareness at contracting. The
first risks that come to mind are ones that concern the attributes of
the product purchased: quality, performance, appearance, safety, etc.
Since Acme did not actually manufacture the product, perhaps the
product falls short of our expectations for it. However, corporations
like Acme have measures in place to address disappointed consumers
regarding the product sold.
Product risks are not the only risks that arise in the supply chain.
Specifically, global supply chains can be sites of significant human
rights abuses.23 These conditions create a number of physical,
economic, and cultural risks for the men, women, and children who
work in these supply chains or whose lives the operations of Acme or
its third-party suppliers negatively impact.24
While those working for or living near supply chain sites bear the
brunt of these risks, supply chains also create a different set of risks
for consumers far away – consumers like Buyer. Specifically,
consumers who purchase goods manufactured in vulnerable supply
chains may unwittingly contribute to those conditions without
knowing these risks when they purchase the product. When

23.

Parella, supra note 1, at 774-775.

24.

See Parella, supra note 1, at 769-784 (discussing various human rights
concerns that stem from Apple’s global commerce).
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consumers later learn of their role, they suffer a type of harm Sarah
Dadush terms “identity harms”:
Identity harm refers to the distress experienced by consumers who
learn that a company with which they transacted has failed to honor
its environmental or social promises. It arises when consumers
discover that, as a result of some form of deception, they have become
unwittingly implicated in a commercial scheme that causes harm to
other beings—the planet (its atmosphere, oceans, rivers, animals, etc.)
or fellow humans.25
According to Dadush, these harms are especially acute when
“conscious consumers” purchase products based on more than price
and physical attributes but also because of “environmental and socialenvironmental impact.”26 When a “green consumer” who cares about
the environment purchases a “clean-fuel car,” she expects that her
purchasing decision is contributing to a cleaner environment (or at
least not damaging it). When she later learns that the “clean-fuel
car” actually pollutes the environment more than she expected, she
suffers an “identity harm” because of her unwitting complicity in
perpetuating the very problem that she had set out to alleviate
through her purchase.
Buyer may still suffer an identity harm even if she is not a
“conscious consumer.”
Widget may not be particularly
environmentally friendly and, even if it is, Buyer may not have
purchased it for those “green” reasons. But simply because Buyer did
not intend to improve the environment through her purchasing
decision does not mean that she intends to contribute to its
destruction or that she is unaffected it turns out that her purchasing
decisions had that effect. She bought Widget without realizing the
risks of negative impact and the possibility of “identity harm.” She
may or may not have purchased Widget had she known the real
nature of the exchange and the risks to her (and third-party victims
in the supply chain). She needed more information to assess that
purchasing decision in light of those risks.
One may object to this conclusion by claiming that most people
are not like Buyer. They care about the quality of the product
purchased and not the nature of the exchange; they are indifferent as
to whether the exchange involves only Acme or 100 suppliers. Supply
chain information does not matter to them.
Admittedly, some consumers may be indifferent the nature of the
exchange and the risks that may arise. However, other consumers
have recently sued companies for failing to alert them at the point of

25.

Dadush, supra note 3 at 3.

26.

See id. (defining conscious consumers and their connections to identity
harms).
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purchase of the risks of human rights abuses in different types of
supply chains.
For example, in Hodsdon v. Mars, plaintiffs allege that Mars uses
child labor in its cocoa supply chain but fails to disclose that risk to
consumers at the point of purchase.27 These plaintiffs claim that
“[h]ad consumers known the truth, they would not have purchased or
paid as much for Mars Chocolate Products.”28 Similarly, in Sud v.
Costco, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit alleging that the food giant failed
to disclose to consumers that its products could have been produced
with slave labor.29 It is important to note that the product that the
consumers received corresponded to their beliefs concerning what they
were buying: they wanted a chocolate bar and they got a chocolate
bar. The product did not change or disappoint. Instead, their
objections concern the nature of the exchange and the risks involved
in that exchange – risks of which they were unaware at the time of
purchase. These complaints reinforce Dadush’s identification of
“identity harms” and consumer demands for information regarding
the nature of the exchange and not just the product purchased.30
B.

Intermediary Liability: How Information is Disclosed Matters

Information disclosure does not only affect consumer behavior. It
also can exert significant influence on the behavior of corporations like
Acme depending on the manner in which this information is disclosed.
There are various approaches that public actors can adopt in order to
improve information regarding conditions in the supply chain. Each of
these information mechanisms can inform the public about conditions
in Acme’s supply chain.
However, information is not an end in itself. The act of revealing
information can encourage change by the actor doing the revealing.
That is why the designers of mandatory disclosure laws hope that
forcing corporations to disclose their due diligence practices in supply
chains will lead to an upgrade of those practices. This organizational
change differs from the sharing of information through disclosure. In
other words, information disclosure involves two different functions:
information function (adding to the supply of information available
about supply chains) and an organizational change function (relating
27.

Class Action Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection
Laws & Demand for Jury Trial at 4-6, Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc. et al., 162
F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D.Cal. 2016) (No. 15-cv-04450).

28.

Id. at 22.

29.

Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 5-7, Sud v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D.Cal.2017) (No. 3:15-cv03783).

30.

Dadush, supra note 3.
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to the likelihood that the organization will change its practices
because of its disclosure obligations).
While different information strategies may be equivalent in the
information function, they potentially vary significantly in the
organizational change function. This latter function relates to how the
information is transmitted to the public. Not all information
mechanisms are equally effective in the organizational change function
even if they are comparable in the information function. Moreover,
the effectiveness of the organization function of an information
mechanism potentially varies according to the industry, corporation,
and market characteristics.
The way we regulate information in the supply chain has
consequences for the likelihood that a brand corporation will exercise
its capacity to detect and deter harm in the supply chain or the
organizational change function. Not all information transmission
regulatory strategies are equal when it comes to this function. Instead,
it is quite likely that each of these strategies imposes different levels
of brand costs on a corporation, thereby applying varying levels of
pressure to detect and deter wrongdoing. The strategy we choose
should be the one that imposes a sufficient level of brand cost on the
corporation to incentivize it to do something about the conditions in
the supply chain.
An optimal information mechanism should incentivize Acme or
another information intermediary to deter harm, not just disclose
information. Acme may not take many steps to deter harm, however,
because it could derive significant benefits from the wrongdoing
committed by Overseas Seller, benefits that exceed those captured by
Overseas Supplier. For those reasons, Acme may have more, not less,
incentive to participate in wrongdoing in the supply chain. For
example, imagine that Acme’s supply chain is notorious for incidents
of environmental damage despite local laws prohibiting it. Let x
represent the value Acme obtains for products made that cause
environmental damage and y represent the value that Overseas
Supplier obtains for the same products. When x > y, Acme has very
little incentive to deter or desist Overseas Supplier from causing
environmental damage.
However, that is only part of the picture. Payoffs are relative.
Even if x > y, Acme has an incentive to deter environmental damage
when the costs of environmental damage exceed x. The most obvious
cost to Acme is brand damage as a result of association with
environmental damage. Many transnational corporations invest
considerable resources in their brand and its management. Brand is
the primary product made by Acme. Brand also ensures that the
exchange between Buyer and Overseas Seller occurs. As such, brand
(or reputational capital) remains front and center for transnational
corporations. When that brand damage, z, exceeds x, it is in Acme’s
interest to deter environmental damage in its supply chain. Critically,
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z is not static;31 instead, as discussed below, it may vary with the
regulatory regime we apply to Acme.
Different types of regulatory responses to supply chain behavior
could possibly impose different levels of brand damage. Consider three
types of regulatory responses: mandatory disclosures, government
investigation, or civil litigation. Each of these may inform the public
that Acme’s supply chain involves child labor and this revelation will
lead to “brand damage.” Brand damage may differ, however, for all
three responses. Some responses may exert a greater level of damage
than the others. For example, stakeholders may react more badly to
news of Acme’s inadequate due diligence regarding environmental
damage when it involves a civil lawsuit than when Acme discloses it
through its mandatory non-financial disclosures.
What supports the belief that these different strategies exert
different levels of reputational damage? This is an empirical question
(not explored here) but some facts indicate that the extent of brand
damage may vary with the mechanism for information dissemination.
First, most people learn about corporate misconduct through the news
media (or, now, social media). But not all information is equally news
worthy. The media picks up some stories over others, so the way that
information gets out matters.32 A mandatory corporate disclosure or
press release acknowledging deficient human rights due diligence is
unlikely to prove as equally newsworthy as a lawsuit or government
investigation alleging the same. The greater the newsworthiness, the
more likely that the media will cover it and that more people will
hear about it. And the more people who hear it, the greater risk that
they will re-evaluate their perceptions of the corporation implicated in
the wrong doing: brand damage.
The type of information mechanism does not only affect the
extent of information dissemination but also the frame through which
we understand it. The media influences how we perceive the
information it shares and our resulting views on the corporation at
issue: “[I]n performing its functions of informing, highlighting, and
framing, the media presents market participants with information
that affects impression formation and the legitimation of firms.”33

31.

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309-11 (2004)
(explaining the cost-benefit analysis facing gatekeepers).

32.

See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES
AND LIMITS 194 (2015) (explaining why the media is “more likely to
cover the press release about a lawsuit than a press release about legal
claims not backed by a lawsuit”).

33.

Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects
in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631, 632
(2003).
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By deciding factors such as the length of a story or its frequency,
the media affects public perceptions regarding which organizations’
behavior most warrants their attention.34 Media coverage also has an
affective aspect related to tone and feeling about various
organizations and influences the perception of organizations.
Therefore, if the media (mainstream, social, etc) react differently to
the regulatory strategy employed (disclosure, litigation, investigation),
then those differences influence how people view information
regarding supply chain conduct and impacts the extent of brand
damage.
Second, self-disclosures by Acme could decrease the extent of
brand damage because of the “stealing thunder” effect: a corporation
facing imminent negative publicity could reduce the effect of that
publicity on its reputation through self-disclosure instead of waiting
for a third-party to share it with the public.35 The availability of
information explains why “stealing thunder” works.36 When things
are rare, we tend to value them more and want them more.37 This
holds true for information as well.38 If a corporation remains silent
following a crisis, “crisis-information” becomes rare, enhancing the
public’s demand for more information and the importance they attach
to the information when it finally emerges (usually from a third
party).39 A corporation in crisis can decrease the demand and salience
of crisis information by contributing to the supply of it through its
own self-disclosures.40 Although mandated disclosures are not the
34.

Craig E. Carroll & Maxwell McCombs, Agenda-setting Effects of
Business News on the Public’s Images and Opinions about Major
Corporations, 6 CORP. REPUTATION. REV. 36, 37 (2003).

35.

An-Sofie Claeys, Verolien Cauberghe, & Mario Pandelaere, Is old news
no news ? The impact of self-disclosure by organizations in crisis, 69 J.
BUS. RES. 3963, 3964 (2016).

36.

See id. (describing impact of “stealing thunder” on self-disclosure).

37.

See id. at 3964-65 (discussing “commodity theory”).

38.

See id. at 3964 (“If the commodity is information, people may not only
desire to read scarce information more and thus devote more attention
to the message. Scarce information may also be more likely to impact
people’s evaluation of the position in the message than would be the
case if the information would not be scarce.”).

39.

See id. at 3965 (discussing impact of crisis on information and selfdisclosure).

40.

See id. at 3968 (“The results show that when an organization selfdiscloses a crisis, both the attention to negative publicity and the
relation of this attention to post-crisis reputation are low, irrespective of
the level of crisis involvement. So, if an organization reveals a crisis,
consumers will neither feel inclined to read subsequent negative
publicity, nor will they let such an attack influence their opinion about
the organization in crisis, even when their involvement with the crisis is
high.”).
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same as voluntary self-disclosures, the research on crisis
communication suggests that information transmitted by the
corporation may not have as much of a negative impact on the
corporation’s reputation compared to when that information is
transmitted by a third-party. This suggests that information from
government investigation and civil lawsuits may exert greater brand
costs.
If true that mandatory disclosure, government investigation, or
civil lawsuit exert different levels of brand damage (z1, z2, and z3,
respectively) on Acme, then we should pick the strategy that
outweighs x. In other words, the benefit that Acme derives from
wrongdoing is not the only factor that will determine whether it
deters Overseas Supplier in the commission of that wrongdoing.
Instead, it will deter Overseas Supplier so long as z > x.41 Z is not
static; instead, it changes based on the type of regulatory response
offered. We need to choose the strategy that causes Acme’s brand
damage to exceed any value it derives from the wrongdoing. Which
strategy accomplishes that may depend on context, varying with the
corporation, its key stakeholders, nature of the supply chain, type of
wrongdoing, and benefits it derives from wrongdoing, among other
factors.
The essential point remains: the optimal information mechanism
should ensure that z > x. It should ensure that the choice of
regulatory strategy (mandatory disclosure, investigation, or litigation)
leads to a level of brand damage that outweighs the level of benefit
that Acme derives from permitting the wrongdoing in its supply
chain. It is an empirical question whether that would be accomplished
through mandatory disclosure, investigation, or litigation. We can
improve the likelihood that Acme will deter wrongdoing in the supply
chain by changing the costs that it faces for that wrongdoing. And
those costs should help determine the regulatory strategy that we
adopt.
Of course, z is not costless either. Different regulatory strategies
require different levels of public (and even private) resources. All
things being equal, we will most likely prefer the least costly
regulatory strategy that will still lead to z > x. However, that
strategy varies among different corporations and supply chains
because the value of z will change based on a number of factors that
vary among supply chains and corporations.

41.

See Coffee, supra note 31, at 318 (discussing factors that deter
corporations).
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Conclusion
It is no secret that brand has power. We gravitate towards some
products over others because of the power of the swoosh or the apple.
But with that power comes great responsibility. At the least, this
responsibility involves informing consumers of the nature of the
exchange they are entering and the risks that are involved. It also
involves a responsibility to the parties at the other end of the supply
chain. Their lives are impacted by the choices transnational
corporations make concerning their brand. Therefore, it is fitting that
brand vulnerability should supply the lever by which to incentivize
transnational corporations to disclose and improve conditions in
supply chains.
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